WASHINGTON, Jan. 12 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ — The Iran Policy Committee held a press conference on Thursday, 11 January 2007, at the National Press Club in Washington, DC to review President Bush’s 10 January 2007 address to the nation on Iraq and release a White Paper titled, How to Make the Surge Work: A Complementary Political-Military Plan for Iraq, introducing a political complement to the proposed American military troop surge to Iraq..Mr. Bruce McColm, Iran Policy Committee, Executive Committee member, set the stage for discussion. Mr. McColm drew attention to the U.S. military raid on the Iranian consulate in the mainly Kurdish city of Erbil in northern Iraq on the day after the President’s 10 January address. U.S. Forces detained at least five Iranian employees in the consulate and seized computers and documents that should be relevant for additional military action against Iranians in Iraq. McColm praised this event "as evidence that the United States may be more willing to counter Iranian subversion of Iraq." McColm also cited Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Hayden testified before Congress that despite earlier skepticism of reports of Iranian operations in Iraq, he now had the "zeal of a convert" on such reports.
General Paul E. Vallely, USA (Ret.), co-chair, IPC Military Committee, and co-author of Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror, followed Mr. McColm by referring to Mr. Alireza Jafarzadeh, author of The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis. Vallely said, "Jafarzadeh had revealed intelligence that suggests a sharp increase in Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and sectarian violence, especially in the past few months. The Qods Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps secretly trains, finances, and arms an extensive terrorist network in Iraq.".In referring to President Bush’s proposal to surge U.S. troops to Iraq, Vallely said,"Based on the intelligence that is now available, it is very clear that Iran is the number one enemy in Iraq. But our enemy, Iran, is not fighting a conventional war against us; it is engaged in an unconventional war."
There he goes again with that "enemy" stuff. Doesn’t he know that we just voted to not participate in the war? "War? We don’t want no stinkin’ war! That’s why we voted for the Dems!"
Vallely continued, "Sending an additional 20,000 U.S. troops to Iraq under current military strategies and rules of engagement will unlikely make much difference." Vallely added,"To prevail, the United States has to transition from a conventional to an unconventional war footing to adjust to Iran’s tactics and make the enemy pay a heavy price for its despicable tactics."
Exactly- we make ’em pay now… or we may pay later.
A shift in tactics is necessary because, "The adversaries in this war do not carry arms openly, wear uniforms or insignias, and abide by other laws and customs of wars specified in Geneva Conventions and protocols. The enemy instills fear in military opponents and local populations through use of suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, and beheadings. And they disguise themselves and hide among civilian populations with weapons stored and discharged from mosques, schools, hospitals, marketplaces, private residences and public roads," Vallely said. General Vallely stated that, "Joint special operators (from all military branches) are trained in local cultures and languages, making it easier for them to embed in local populations and Iraqi security forces and collect information, which in turn may be used to ‘hunt and kill’ hostile forces backed by Iran."
Captain Charles T. "Chuck" Nash, USN (Ret.), Iran Policy Committee, Executive Committee member, followed General Vallely. Captain Nash stated that, "Eighty percent of all of the reported violence in Iraq occurs within 30 miles of Baghdad, and only 23% of U.S. troops in Iraq are classified as combat personnel. If the additional troops to Iraq follow this ratio, the surge is unlikely to improve the situation." Captain Nash said, "The enemy has been using stand-off weapons, such as improvised explosive devices.
Embedding troops in the neighborhoods should be an improvement over driving through the streets in armored convoys. The enemy will not be able to plant IEDs in streets that U.S. Forces are constantly patrolling on foot. The key to counterinsurgency is winning hearts and minds by providing security."
Captain Nash reinforced General Vallely’s presentation by asserting that additional troops must be accompanied by a shift to counterinsurgency strategy, instead of conventional warfare to neutralize Iran.
Professor Raymond Tanter, President of the Iran Policy Committee, discussed President Bush’s address to the nation of 10 January 2007. Professor Tanter stated, "President Bush said that the United States would ‘seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq,’ referring directly to Iran. Although the President’s address did not explicitly commit the U.S. military to disarm illegal Iraqi militias, he would have to do so to make the surge successful."
Professor Tanter continued, "President Bush adheres to Clausewitz’s dictum, ‘War is a continuation of politics by other means,’ in closely linking increased military presence and actions in Iraq with concrete political objectives. However, political benchmarks have proven elusive, especially since the ascension of the Maliki government in Iraq, which is beholden to Iranian proxies." Tanter said, "Unless President Bush can make
the case that an increased troop presence will be accompanied by a new and credible political approach in Baghdad, he is likely to lose political support at home, diminishing the potential for success in Iraq."
That case needs to be clear and understandable to the American people. Unless the people know the true story and bring pressure to bear upon a Democratic Congress hell-bent on seeing to it that President Bush is completely discredited, we’re gonna lose this a la Viet Nam.
Drawing on the conclusion of the White Paper, Professor Tanter said, "Because the Iranian regime is the primary power broker in Iraq, it is necessary for the United States to devise methods of restraining Tehran’s influence. Countering the Iranian regime in Iraq requires reaching out to its main opposition-the Mujahedeen-e Khalq. But such a move is not to assist the MEK; rather, reaching out to the MEK serves as a political counterweight to the Iranian regime’s influence in Iraq, helps the United States end the sectarian violence and the insurgency, and balances the U.S. Government offer to join the international community in holding direct talks with the Iranian regime."
Professor Tanter also said, "As the Iranian regime increases sectarian strife in Iraq, new analysis by the Iran Policy Committee suggests a role for the Iranian opposition in Iraq to help build a national compact among Iraqi factions." Professor Tanter concluded, "One way to overcome the acrimony between the U.S. Government and Sunni politicians is to utilize an interlocutor trusted by both groups. The Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) in Iraq can function in just this capacity; indeed, the MEK already engages in quiet negotiations with Iraqi factions and has excellent relations with the
U.S. military."
This group has obviously put a lot of thought into this subject. Instead of looking to simply extricate ourselves from a war that might feature enemies who won’t let us do so, (an enemy that we refuse to even identify as such) the Iran Policy Committee accepts the reality and offers some logical ideas worth trying. Hopefully somebody important will give them a listen…