The public-choice approach denies the assumption that government employees act in single-minded pursuit of the public interest, defined as allocative [Pareto] optimality. That belief lacks any theoretical or empirical basis. Oddly enough, many who support a shift in regulation from market to government processes because the market fails to provide the “right” incentives simultaneously disregard the possibility that government institutions also fail to provide the “right” incentives.
– Louis De Alessi
Indeed. Progressives have always wanted to have impartial, non-partisan technocrats should be making “expert” decisions on guiding how society should operate. In order to do so, they seek to accumulate power in as high a centralized Government center of Power – and in doing so, remove the efficacy of the peons in that society in complaining.
And rebelling against what is good for them.
But De Allessi asks the right question (as well as F.A. Hayek): so how does merely being in Government make one smarter than those of us in Civil Society to the point that they should decide how we should live our lives?
The Bigger the Government, the smaller the Citizen
