H/T to Bob Clegg for posting a link (on Facebook) to an October 28th NH State Supreme Court decision regarding (2013-0690, Appeal of Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154 ).
Hudson stopped voluntarily providing step increases for fire fighters outside a collective bargaining agreement and the Union took issue. An arbitrator determined that the Town had to pay, but the town chose to ignore this. The union cried foul and called in the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) who, after reviewing the law and the case, decided in favor of the Town of Hudson.
The case found its way the NH State Supreme Court and they have ruled on the dispute.
The Union filed a complaint with the PELRB alleging that the Town’s failure to comply constituted an unfair labor practice, see RSA 273-A:5, I(h), (i) (2010), and asking, in part, that the PELRB “order the Town to comply with the arbitrator’s award.” In response, the Town argued that the arbitration award violated the requirements of RSA 273-A:3, II(b) (2010) (amended 2013) and was contrary to public policy. The PELRB agreed with the Town, concluding that “[t]he arbitrator’s award violates a strong and dominant policy, namely the need for approval by the local legislative body of the expenditure of public monies to fund benefits like step increases for bargaining unit employees both during a contract’s express term and during any interval between collective bargaining agreements.” Accordingly, the PELRB found that the Town did not commit an unfair labor practice by failing to comply with the arbitrator’s award and, therefore, dismissed the Union’s complaint.
…
The Union “does not contest the fact that the Town had the right not to pay [the] step increases.” It argues, instead, that, under the facts of this case, the Town’s past practice of paying step increases “created an obligation that was . . . tantamount to a waiver of that right.” We are not convinced by the Union’s argument; rather, we agree with the Town that the payment of step increases, even if a “past practice,” remains a discretionary matter and does not subject the Town to a binding obligation.
…
We conclude that, in accordance with the “strong and dominant public policy” expressed in RSA chapter 273-A and our case law, the status quo doctrine did not require the Town to continue paying step increases after the 2006 CBA expired, even though it had previously provided such increases during the status quo period. Accordingly, because the arbitrator’s award violates this policy, the PELRB correctly concluded that the award is not enforceable.
While that is all well and good, within the text of the decision, the Court provided some details that I can’t help but think have wide ranging value, though I am not quite sure yet how. (Emphasis mine.)
“Administrative agencies are granted only limited and special subject matter jurisdiction.” Appeal of Amalgamated Transit Union, 144 N.H. 325, 327 (1999) (quotation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted). “Because administrative agencies act in a quasi-judicial capacity, agencies inherently have limited jurisdiction to apply strong and dominant public policy as expressed in controlling statutes, regulations, common law, and other applicable authority, to address matters necessary to resolve questions arising within the scope of their jurisdiction.” Id. at 327-28 (citation omitted).
Administrative agencies have limited jurisdiction.
You just don’t hear that every day, do you?
