AFGHANISTAN - THE LEAST WORST OPTION - Granite Grok

AFGHANISTAN – THE LEAST WORST OPTION

Last night President Obama finally gave us his long awaited answer to the question of what we should do about Afghanistan. As a candidate for the U.S. Congress, I very reluctantly endorse his decision to add an additional 30,000 troops to that conflict.
 
However, serious questions remain to be answered about the decision making process leading up to this decision, the viability of this escalation, as well as the underlying strategy itself. Oddly, the President took a full three months to give us a slightly scaled down version of General McChrystal’s request. His delay has unfortunately brought into question both his resolve and his strength as a leader. It has also fed into the growing domestic and international view of timidity in this Administration.
 
In the end, what the President gave us was a strategy which merely buys another year and a half for Afghanistan to build up its forces and for us to exit somewhat gracefully. The odds are very high that neither will happen as planned. Since he merely stated that “after eighteen months our troops will begin to come home,” he has merely kicked the can down the road and bought us additional time.
 
What the President knows but did not say is that the real key to this equation is not Afghanistan but Pakistan. Pakistan is currently the most dangerous country in the world. It is now a highly unstable nuclear power that is rapidly coming apart at the seams. The nightmare scenario is that Pakistan collapses and nuclear weapons get into the hands of Al Qaeda and/or the Taliban.
 
Chaos is Afghanistan would further destabilize Pakistan. Our presence will help keep Afghanistan together and serves to provide at least a partial buffer against insurgent incursions across Pakistan’s border. It is also prudent for us to be close by in case the situation in Pakistan collapses.
 
Fortunately, the President quickly took off the table a precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan as many Democrats have urged. Such a measure would have lead to a major power vacuum in the country and another protracted civil war. Al Qaeda would have been handed a huge political and psychological victory both in Afghanistan and around the world.
 
Still, the newly announced strategy carries with it numerous inherent problems and contradictions. Some of the open issues include:

  1. Last night’s announcement represents a major escalation of that conflict in a manner that is eerily reminiscent of our experience in Vietnam. History seldom repeats itself but the echoes of Vietnam are clear to those of us who were around to witness that tragic war. In Afghanistan, we have quickly gone from 30,000 troops to over 100,000 with training as the chief objective – just as we did in Vietnam.
  2. Ultimately, we failed to stop our enemy in Vietnam with roughly 500,000 troops and over 58,000 of our finest killed and at least five times that number seriously wounded or permanently maimed. Yet Afghanistan has twice the land mass of Vietnam. How can we possibly get this job done with so much less military resources and without the support of our allies who are based in the more passive sectors of the country?
  3. President Johnson took the middle ground in Vietnam and it didn’t work. Why will it work in Afghanistan?
  4. As in Vietnam, we are once again committed to propping up a thoroughly corrupt and brutal regime which is wholly incapable of standing up on its own two feet. Nor does it have the support of its own people.
  5. Worse yet, Afghanistan’s economy is now not much more than a narco-state. Its’ most senior leadership stands accused of being directly involved in the opium trade.
  6. The recent pattern of this conflict has us favoring one ethnic group (the Tajiks) over the Pashtuns whose numbers are twice as large, while leaving the several other ethnic groups (principally the Uzbeks, the Hazara, the Aimal and the Turkmen) out in the cold. The chances of this working in the short, medium or long run are slim  to none.
  7. Pres. Obama has called this effort counter-insurgency. But true counter-insurgency is ultimately nation building. Sadly, Afghanistan is so visibly backwards after thirty years of constant war that the resources required far outstrip the resources we can commit to that effort. We have seen how hard nation building has been in Iraq which had deep history of cultural leadership and an established middle class. Afghanistan today has nothing left but rubble, drugs and strife.
  8. As a nation, we have already spent $200 billion in Afghanistan. We cannot afford this adventure. Our national financings are already on the edge of fiscal soundness and the dollar is quite clearly buckling under the strain. Nation building would require decades and trillions of dollars which we certainly cannot afford.
  9. The U.S. military is stretched very thin and morale (as measured by the record high suicide rate) is at unprecedented low levels.
  10. The current ratio of American soldiers to Afghan troops in the field is overwhelmingly American. One is entitled to ask how long will it take for us to train up an effective native Afghan force that can defend their own country? The odds that we can do so in eighteen months are close to impossible.
  11. Even as we are increasing our troop levels, we are signaling the withdrawing our forces. This hardly projects a message of resolve.
  12. Even if we could secure Afghanistan from Al Qaeda, what is to prevent them from taking up new bases and training facilities in Somalia, Sudan, Yemen or numerous other failed states where they can find refuge? Should we invade those countries with nation building efforts as well?

As the conservative columnist George Will has recently pointed out, our current policy of “control, hold and build” is unworkable. None of these goals can be attained. Over the last nine years we have squandered the opportunity to improve the situation in Afghanistan, and in so doing, we have lost the support and good will of its people.
 
But, the current announcement is the least worst option available to us.
 
 

Bob Bestani is a long time resident of Newmarket where he is active in local government.  Professionally Bob is a visiting scholar for Stanford University.  Prior to Stanford, he had served as the Director General of Private Sector Finance and Operations at the Asian Development Bank, Managing Director at PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S Treasury for the first Bush Administration.

 

For more information please visit www.BobBestani.com.
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